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Abstract:   We examine the effects of oil rents on corruption and state stability 
exploiting the exogenous within-country variation of a new measure of oil rents for a 
panel of 30 oil-exporting countries during the period 1992 to 2005. We find that an 
increase   in   oil   rents   significantly   increases   corruption,   significantly   deteriorates 
political rights while at the same time leading to a significant improvement in civil 
liberties. We argue that these findings can be explained by the political elite having an 
incentive to extend civil liberties but reduce political rights in the presence of oil 
windfalls to evade redistribution and conflict. We support our argument documenting 
that there is a significant effect of oil rents on corruption in countries with a high share 
of state participation in oil production while no such link exists in countries where state 
participation in oil production is low. 
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A popular belief in the political science and political economy literature is that oil rents are 
associated with corruption and state instability. Ross (1999b) reviews the political aspects of why 
resource rich countries tend to manage their economies poorly, arguing that state ownership of the 
resource industry leads politicians to abuse political power for private purposes. More specifically, 
Karl (2004)  argues that countries dependent on oil are often characterized by corruption and 
exceptionally poor governance, a culture of rent-seeking, and high incidences of civil conflict and 
inter-state war.
1 The empirical evidence on the link between oil rents, corruption, and state stability 
is however scarce at best. Most of the  literature has been either anecdotal or is plagued by 
endogeneity   biases   related   to   difficult-to-measure   (and   often   unobservable)   cross-country 
differences in institutional arrangements, culture, tastes, or other deep historical factors that are 
often neglected in cross-country analysis. As a consequence, it is not possible to state with great 
confidence, typically required for policy action to be justified, that oil windfalls posit a political 
economy problem and hence require swift policy responses.
The purpose of this paper is to examine with rigorous panel data techniques the link between 
oil rents, corruption, and various measures of state stability. Our empirical analysis differs from 
existing cross-sectional studies (see Svensson, 2005; or Treisman, 2007, for a review), as we 
emphasize fixed effects specifications that link within-country variation in oil rents to within-
country variation in corruption and state stability. This allows us to circumvent an important 
endogeneity bias that arises because of unobserved cross-country heterogeneity. Using country 
fixed effects has moreover the advantage of circumventing country-specific perception biases and 
difficulties in comparing cross-country corruption scores due to non-homogeneity of survey 
methodologies applied across countries by surveying institutions. From a policy perspective, the 
relevant question in terms of risk management is also what happens to corruption and state stability 
1 See also Fearon (2005) who argues that oil states are exposed to a significantly higher risk of suffering from civil 
war because oil producers have relatively low state capabilities and because oil makes state or regional control a 
tempting price.  
1in countries in the presence of windfalls from oil rents, which is a question inherently related to 
within-country variation in oil rents and therefore well addressed by our econometric framework.
Our main finding is that increases in oil rents significantly increase corruption, significantly 
deteriorate political rights, but have no significant effects on measures of state instability. At the 
same time, we find that increases in oil rents significantly improve civil liberties. Focusing on the 
distributional conflict between the political elite and the masses, we argue that our findings are well 
explained by the political elite having an incentive to reduce political rights to evade a loss of the 
rent income that accrues to the political elite in the presence of oil windfalls. While a reduction in 
political rights reduces the risk of a loss of the rent income due to redistribution, reducing political 
rights potentially also increases the likelihood of violent conflict as the masses could try to capture 
part of the oil rents through violent means. To therefore quell the masses the political elite must 
extend civil liberties in order to evade costly intra-state conflict. We support our argument 
documenting that there is a significant effect of oil rents on corruption, political rights, and civil 
liberties in countries with a high share of state participation in oil production while no such link 
exists in countries where state participation in oil production is low.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 places our paper into the 
context of the related resource curse literature. Section 3 describes our oil rent data. Section 4 
explains the estimation  strategy.  Section 5 discusses the main empirical results. Section 6 
concludes.
2. Related Literature
There exist a number of empirical studies that have investigated the impact of resource rents on 
corruption, political institutions, or state stability (e.g. Hamilton and Clemens, 1999; Gilmore et al., 
2005; Djankov et al., 2008; Collier and Hoeffler, 2009; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010; Haber and 
Menaldo, 2010; Tsui, 2010). These studies have typically relied on measures of resource rents that 
2are based on time-series variation in the international commodity prices as well as variations in the 
quantity of the commodity extracted and the extraction costs. While for most countries variations in 
the commodity prices are a plausibly exogenous source of variation in resource rents, it is likely that 
variations in the quantity of the resource extracted changes in response to within-country changes in 
corruption and state stability. Indeed, Robinson et al. (2006) provide a theoretical framework where 
politicians over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they 
discount the future too much. Also, the security component associated with the cost of extraction is 
likely to be endogenous to civil conflict rendering the use of the latter measure of resource rents 
ineffective in isolating the effect of rents on conflict. In contrast, the within-country time-series 
variation of our measure of oil rents is more plausibly exogenous as it is driven by the international 
oil price and made country-specific by exogenous cross-country differences in geology. Therefore, 
we are able to identify in a more credible way the causal effect that within-country variation of oil 
rents has on corruption and state instability.
The focus of our paper is exclusively on oil rents, which ensures the homogeneity in the 
effects of resource rents on corruption and state stability. A recent literature has shown the 
importance of not pooling commodities when analyzing the effects of resource rents on governance 
and growth. For instance, Isham et al. (2005) show using cross-country regressions that while point 
source exporting countries do relatively poorly across an array of governance indicators countries 
with natural resource exports that are diffuse (e.g. livestock and agricultural products) do not show 
the same strong effects and have had more robust growth recoveries. On the conflict side, Dube and 
Vargas (2008) show that while positive income shocks from international coffee prices significantly 
reduce the risk of civil conflict in Columbia, positive oil price shocks significantly increase it.
2 
A related literature also looks at the effects of resource rents on political systems and on 
state stability. While Ross (1999a) shows that oil rents significantly undermine democracy, Haber 
2  See also Bruckner and Ciccone (2010) who find that in Sub-Saharan Africa the risk of civil war outbreak is 
significantly lower during times of commodity price induced recessions than during times of commodity price 
induced booms. 
3and Menaldo (2010) find that oil does not significantly foster authoritarianism. Several scholars 
have also offered different theories of the impact of natural resource wealth on civil conflict: 
mineral wealth could foster conflicts by funding rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004); 
weakening state institutions (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005); making the 
state a more attractive target for rebels (Fearon and Laitin, 2003); facilitating trade shocks 
(Humphreys, 2005); making separatism financially attractive in resource rich regions (Le Billon, 
2005; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004); or through other processes (Ross, 2006; Humphreys, 2005). We 
also contribute to that literature focusing again on the relationship between within-country variation 
of oil rents and within-country variation in political systems and civil conflict. 
Finally, studying the impact of oil rents on corruption is also relevant to understanding the 
economic performance of resource rich countries. Indeed, our paper is related to the literature on the 
impact of natural resources on economic growth, also known as the resource curse (see Van der 
Ploeg, 2010, for a survey). Moreover, our paper is related to the literature on corruption and growth 
performance. Among others, Mauro (1995) attempts using cross-sectional regressions to isolate the 
exogenous effect of corruption on economic growth and investment. He finds that corruption has a 
statistically significant negative impact on both growth and investment. More recently, Beck and 
Laeven (2006) also find that dependence on natural resources and the historical experience of these 
countries with socialism was a major determinant of institution building during transition. Using 
natural resource reliance and the years under socialism to extract the exogenous component of 
institution building, Beck and Laeven show the importance of institutions in explaining the 
variation in economic development and growth in transition economies. 
Beyond the fixed effects regression framework that allows us to circumvent important 
identification   issues   related   to   unobserved   cross-country   heterogeneity,   a   further   important 
contribution of our paper is that we exploit a unique dataset of oil rents that satisfy quite plausibly 
the important requirement of exogeneity of oil rents to corruption and state instability. Specifically, 
4we rely on the unit export value of oil, collected through IMF surveys conducted by desk 
economists, as a proxy for oil rents. The unit export value of oil is constructed using the 
international oil price interacted with a country-specific discount factor that captures the quality of 
oil in a given country. The producibility and quality of oil are in part exogenously determined by 
country-specific geological factors. These geological factors in turn determine the chemical 
properties of oil (such as oil viscosity, sulfur content, and acid number), which in turn determine the 
price at which the oil can be sold on the competitive international oil market. In the next section we 
explain in detail the construction of our oil rent data. 
3. Oil Rent Data
Our proxy for oil rents is the oil export unit value taken from Ossowski et al. (2008). The oil export unit 
value is available for 30 oil-producing countries during the 1992 to 2005 period. The data was 
collected through IMF internal surveys of country desk economists for all oil-producing countries 
where fiscal oil revenue accounted for at least 20 percent of total fiscal revenue in 2004 and for 
which sufficient information was available.
3 
Specifically, the unit export value of oil was constructed using the international crude oil 
price interacted with a country-specific discount factor that captures the quality of oil in a given 
country. The oil export unit value can therefore be decomposed into two components: (i) the 
international crude oil price that is common to all oil producing countries, and (ii) the country-
specific discount factor that captures the quality of the crude oil. Because we control in our 
empirical analysis for common year fixed effects (see Section 4 below) identification of the impact 
of oil rents on outcome variables comes from the interaction between the international oil price and 
the country-specific discount factor. Any variation in oil rents that are exclusively due to variation 
3 The countries included in the sample are Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Cameroon, Chad, Republic 
of Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and 
Tobago, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Vietnam, and the Republic of Yemen.
5in the international oil price will therefore be fully captured by the common year fixed effect. 
Kilian (2009) documents that there is little evidence for coordinated behavior of OPEC in 
systematically affecting the international oil price. While this may be true for the international oil 
price, domestic economic conditions will affect the country-specific quantity of oil produced.
4 In 
contrast, the country-specific quality of oil that drives the discount factor used to construct our oil 
revenue measure is determined by geology (such as the detailed structure of the oil field, its depth 
or whether the oil is located in deep water). The combination of these geological factors in turn 
determines the chemical properties of the oil (e.g. gravity, viscosity, sulfur content, and acid 
number), which in turn determines the price at which the oil can be sold on the international oil 
market. Hence, country-specific geological factors affect country-specific oil rents by affecting the 
country-specific unit price at which domestic oil production can be sold. Tables 1 and 2 provide a 
description of all variables used in our empirical analysis as well as some summary statistics. In 
Appendix Table 1 we also list the average country-specific discount factors and the respective 
country-specific average corruption and polity scores. 
4. Estimation Strategy
We now explain our estimation strategy that allows us to estimate the effect of country-specific 
changes in oil rents on country-specific changes in corruption (and other outcome variables of 
interest). Specifically, we estimate the model:
ΔCorruptionit = αi + γt +βΔOil Rentsit + ΓX it + uit
where αi are country fixed effects that capture unobservable time-invariant country characteristics, 
and γt are year fixed effects that capture shocks common to all countries. The parameter estimate β 
reflects therefore the marginal effect that country-specific changes in oil rents have on country-
specific changes in corruption. Other control variables (Xit) varying at the country-year level that 
4 Similarly, the discovery of new oil fields which constitute an important source of oil rents cannot be treated as 
exogenous as corruption and state instability affect exploration costs and hence the likelihood that an oil field will be 
discovered.  
6we include in our empirical analysis as a robustness check are the first difference in non-oil GDP (Δ 
Non-Oil GDPit), which controls for the change in income unrelated to the oil sector; the first 
difference in oil production (ΔOil Productionit), which controls for the change in the quantity of oil 
produced; and lagged corruption (Lagged Corruptionit-1), which captures convergence effects in the 
level of corruption as corruption scores are bounded. We present estimates using least squares 
estimation but also system-GMM estimation (Blundell and Bond, 1998) to deal with possible biases 
arising from dynamic panel data estimates in the presence of fixed effects. The error term uit  is 
clustered at the country level and may hence be arbitrarily serially correlated within countries.
As a note, we would like to point out that a key advantage of the above fixed effects 
estimation strategy is that it addresses criticisms related to perception biases in the coding of 
corruption scores. Such perception biases usually prevent the consistent estimation of the effect that 
resource rents have on corruption. For instance, one may imagine that the relative difference in 
historical ties between two oil producing countries vis-à-vis the country where the rating agency is 
based can lead the rating agency to perceive that the country more distant in historical ties to the 
rating agency based country is more corrupt. Also, increases in international oil prices could lead to 
the perception that corruption is increasing over time in all oil producing countries. Both of these 
biases are fully captured by our country and year fixed effects, and hence do not lead to biased 
estimates of the marginal effect that increases in oil rents have on corruption. 
5. Main Results 
Oil Rents and Corruption. Table 3 summarizes our estimation results of the link between within-
country variation in oil rents and within-country variation in corruption. Column (1) shows the least 
squares estimates where control variables are country fixed effects as well as year fixed effects 
(both jointly significant at the 1% level). The obtained point estimate on our oil rents measure is 
0.460, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. The point estimate in column (1) implies 
7that a 1 standard deviation increase in the unit export value of oil increases corruption by about 0.32 
standard deviations. In column (2) we show that this adverse link between oil rents and corruption 
remains statistically significant when controlling for within-country variation in non-oil per capita 
income. Column (3) shows that this continues to be the case when controlling for the quantity of oil 
produced, which enters as statistically insignificant.
We furthermore document the robustness of our static panel estimates to dynamics in 
corruption scores by including the lagged corruption score as a right-hand-side regressor, see 
columns (4) and (5). We present both least squares estimates as well as system-GMM (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998) estimates as least squares estimates of dynamic panel data models are biased in the 
presence of country fixed effects. We find however that regardless of whether least squares or 
system-GMM estimation is used that the lagged dependent variable enters as highly statistically 
negative, implying a half-life of (transitory) shocks to corruption scores of about 1.4 years. We also 
find that within-country increases in oil rents continue to exhibit statistically significant and 
quantitatively large adverse effects on within-country changes in the level of corruption.
5 
In Table 4 we show, using instrumental variables techniques, that increases in corruption are 
associated with significantly lower levels of oil production in our sample (columns (1)-(3)). 
Importantly, columns (4)-(6) of Table 4 show that increases in corruption do not significantly affect 
our measure of oil rents that is based on variation in the quality rather than the quantity of oil. We 
note that the quality of our instrumental variables (lagged corruption and the Polity2 score) is 
reasonable, as the Hansen test does not reject the validity of the excluded instruments and the first-
stage yields a highly significant relationship between the instruments and the endogenous regressor. 
The significant negative response of oil production to corruption is an important result in the sense 
that it can explain why least-squares estimation of the effect of oil production on corruption is 
insignificant (there is a negative reverse causality bias) while our measure of oil rents produces a 
5 We have also checked whether our results are sensitive to outliers by applying the Grubbs test. Dropping those 
observations deemed as outliers by the Grubbs test yielded highly statistically significant point estimates on our oil 
rent measure that were quantitatively larger than the estimates reported in Table 3 (results not shown). 
8significant positive average effect on corruption. 
To explore potential cross-country heterogeneity in the impact that oil rents have on 
corruption, we present in Table 5 estimates of an interaction model where we allow the marginal 
effect of oil rents on corruption to vary as a function of country-specific characteristics. In 
particular,   we   check   whether   cross-country   differences   in   institutional   democracy   lead   to 
heterogeneous effects of oil rents on corruption by including an interaction effect between our oil 
rents measure and the Polity2 score (column (1)) as well as the checks and balances score (column 
(2)). We find that these interaction terms are quantitatively small and statistically insignificant. 
Hence,   we   do   not   find   evidence   that   cross-country   differences   in   democratic   institutions 
significantly affect the marginal impact that oil rents have on corruption.
6 While perhaps surprising 
given the findings of the empirical institutions literature that emphasizes political institutions as key 
determinants for long-run economic development (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002), the easiest 
reading of these results is that oil rents have a statistically significant average effect on corruption 
while the insignificance on the interaction term could be due to a variety of factors such as for 
example measurement error in political institutions. In columns (3)-(5) we also document that 
cross-country differences in ethnic fractionalization, the share of Protestants in the population, and 
colonial origin do not significantly affect the negative marginal effect of oil rents on corruption that 
we documented in Table 3. Interestingly, we also do not find evidence that African oil exporters are 
more prone to suffer from corruption due to increases in oil rents than non-African oil exporters 
(see column (6) of Table 5). 
Oil Rents and Polity Outcomes. In order to foster our understanding of the negative effect of oil 
rents on corruption, it is useful to investigate whether oil rents have a significant direct effect on 
political institutions. We explore this question in Table 6 by examining how a variety of polity 
6 Interestingly, we find that stronger checks and balances have an individually positive effect on corruption, 
significantly reducing corruption levels as documented for instance by Keefer and Knack (2007). 
9measures respond to changes in country-specific oil rents. A key issue here is whether oil rents 
directly undermine political procedures as captured for instance by the Polity2 score and the checks 
and balances score, or whether oil rents just affect political outcomes as captured predominantly by 
the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties score. In columns (1) and (2) we therefore 
estimate, using our panel fixed effects regression framework, the effect that oil rents have on the 
Polity2 score and the checks and balances score; in columns (3) and (4) we do the same for the 
Freedom House political rights and the civil liberties score. As can be seen from columns (1) and 
(2) of Table 6, there are no significant effects of within-country changes in oil rents on within-
country changes in the Polity2 and checks and balances scores. However, we do find a significant 
effect of within-country variations in oil rents on both political rights and civil liberties scores. In 
particular, we find that while increases in oil rents significantly deteriorate political rights they lead 
to significant improvements in civil liberties: a 1 standard deviation increase in the unit export value 
of oil reduces political rights by about 0.21 standard deviations and increases civil liberties by about 
0.33 standard deviations. 
What explains this asymmetry in the response of political rights and civil liberties to oil 
rents? There could clearly be a number of possible reasons but a useful way in answering this 
question is to focus on the distributional conflict between the political elite and the masses. 
Extending political rights to the masses implies for the political elite a loss in oil rents due to 
redistribution. The political elite therefore has an incentive to keep political rights low in the 
presence of oil windfalls in order to prevent the masses from sharing in on the pie. The reduction in 
political rights, which impedes the masses from sharing in on the rents may however trigger 
substantial discontent. In particular, if the masses cannot share in on the oil rents via redistribution 
then violence in form of civil conflict may emerge as the masses struggle to capture direct control 
over the oil resources (see for instance Hirshleifer, 2001). One of the instruments available to the 
elite to quell the masses in the presence of such oil windfalls is to extend civil liberties. By doing 
10so, the political elite significantly reduces the risk of civil conflict while at the same time preserves 
its rent income from oil revenues by reducing political rights.
In Table 7 we document this conflict channel by showing that while both increases in civil 
liberties and political rights significantly reduce the likelihood in our sample of civil conflict 
incidence as well as civil conflict onset, there are no significant effects of oil rents on either civil 
conflict incidence or civil conflict onset.
7  This is consistent with our argument above that the 
political elite has an incentive to reduce political rights in order to evade a loss of rent income due 
to redistribution and extend civil liberties to evade the outbreak of civil conflict. Increases in oil 
rents must therefore not necessarily increase the risk of civil conflict on average as long as the 
political elite optimally quells the masses by increasing civil liberties. In the Appendix we present a 
simple reduced form model to illustrate our argument in an also more formal way.
To provide some empirical support for the implicit assumption made in our argument above 
that oil rents accrue to a high degree to the political elite, we document in Table 8 that there is a 
significant link between oil rents and corruption, and oil rents and political rights as well as civil 
liberties in those countries with a high share of state participation in oil production. In countries 
where the share of state participation in oil production is on the other hand relatively low within-
country variation in oil rents does not have a significant effect on corruption, political rights, or 
civil liberties. This finding matches well with what Ross (1999b) suggests as one of the more 
promising explanations for the resource curse – the state ownership of natural resources. Because 
rent income accrues in petrostates directly to the government budget, oil rents are easily diverted by 
the political elite into their own pockets. When extending political rights, the political elite looses 
control over the rent income and therefore refrains from extending political rights in the presence of 
oil windfalls. Instead, the political elite extends civil liberties and thereby significantly reduces the 
7 We present logit fixed effects estimates for the effect that oil rents have on the civil conflict incidence and onset 
indicator variable to take into account the non-linear nature of the dependent variable. Because our oil measure is 
plausibly exogenous to within-country variation in the risk of conflict, presenting logit fixed effects is appropriate 
but this is not the case for political rights and civil liberties because political rights and civil liberties are clearly 
endogenous to the presence of civil conflict. We therefore present for the political rights score and civil liberties 
score GMM estimates and show for comparison purposes also the GMM estimates for oil rents.  
11risk of intra-state conflict. On net, increases in oil rents are therefore associated with a significant 
increase in corruption, lower political rights, greater civil liberties and no overall increase in the risk 
of civil conflict.
6. Conclusion
Obtaining a consistent estimate of the causal effect that oil rents have on corruption and state 
stability is complicated by difficult-to-measure and often unobservable cross-country heterogeneity, 
perception biases, and the endogenous response of oil production to corruption. Our paper addresses 
these important issues by using panel fixed effects regressions and a new measure of country-
specific oil rents that is driven by cross-country differences in geology. Our main finding is that 
within-country increases in oil rents lead to significant within-country increases in corruption, 
significant within-country decreases in political rights, as well as significant within-country 
increases in civil liberties. On the other hand, we find that on average within-country increases in 
oil rents did not have a significant overall effect on the risk of civil conflict.
8 
While our results therefore confirm the common held belief that oil rents are associated with 
corruption and a worsening of political rights, they reject the hypothesis that oil rents are a direct 
threat to state stability. From the policy perspective it is hence not the case that investors have to 
fear that windfalls from oil rents are a threat to their investment projects because oil windfalls make 
civil conflict more likely.
9 Instead, what policy makers should be aware of and concerned about is 
that oil rents significantly increase corruption, which bears a substantial welfare loss due to the 
misallocation of resources and the costs associated with secrecy (Murphy et al. 1991, 1993; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993). 
On the policy front, a relatively recent international initiative named Extractive Industry 
8 We have also examined the effect of within-country changes in our oil rent measure on other forms of state 
instability such as the risk of coup d’etats, revolutions, assassinations, purges, strikes, as well as riots and did not 
find a significant relationship (results not shown).   
9 The destructive forces and threat to economic development of civil conflicts are now well recognized among policy 
makers, see for instance World Bank (2003).  
12Transparency Initiative (EITI) is pushing for further transparency in the oil, gas and minerals 
extractive industries. This appears a promising initiative as EITI requests governments and 
companies that operate in participating countries to declare the amount of money received from oil 
exports. At this stage it is too early to assess econometrically whether the countries that have 
voluntarily decided to participate have reduced their level of corruption.
10 An interesting direction 
for future research is therefore to examine using rigorous econometric techniques whether EITI 
participating countries have significantly lower levels of corruption due to the presence of oil 
windfalls than those countries that did not sign the transparency initiative. In addition, it may be of 
interest to compare whether home-grown initiatives for creating transparency in public resource 
administration are more or less effective than international initiatives such as EITI.
10  To date, Azerbaijan is the only country that has completed EITI validation and become EITI compliant.
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16Appendix. A Simple Model of Corruption, Political Rights, and Civil Liberties
We present here a simple reduced form model where the political ruler maximizes expected utility 
from resource income (R) by choosing the optimal level of corruption (C), the optimal level of 
political rights (POL), and the optimal level of civil liberties (CL). The political ruler can provide 
public goods (G), which are financed from the resource income (R). Alternatively, the political ruler 
can divert part of the resource income (R) for private (consumption) purposes (C). For simplicity 
we abstract from tax revenues, so that the budget constraint for public good provision can be written 
as:
(1) G + C = R 
We assume that the probability (p) for the political ruler to stay in power is increasing in civil 
liberties (CL), political rights (POL), and public goods (G). More formally, the probability (p) of 
staying in power is:
(2) p = f(CL, POL/C, R-C)
where the third argument on the right-hand side of the above equation follows from the budget 
constraint in equation (1). The  POL/C  term captures that political rights, in contrast to civil 
liberties, have the feature that with more political rights the political ruler is increasingly 
accountable to the public, and that increases in corruption lower the probability (p) of staying in 
power the stronger the political rights. 
The expected utility of a risk-neutral political ruler who derives utility from personal income 
C, and disutility from extending political rights (POL) and civil liberties (CL) is
(3) Expected Utility = p*C – g(POL,CL)






























To obtain a closed form solution and to further simplify the model as much as possible we consider 
a linear probability function p = POL/C+CL+R-C and focus on the case where POL, CL, R, and C 
are such so that p is on the unit intervall. Under a quadratic and additive cost function g(POL,C) = 
1/2(POL*R)
2  –  1/2(CL)
2, where the multiplicative term  R*POL  reflects that extending political 




opt as a function of R can be obtained by solving the system of equations of the 








Hence, political rights decrease in response to an increase in resource rents while civil liberties and 
corruption increase.
18Table 1. Description of Variables
Variable Description Source
Oil Rents Oil rents are proxied for by the unit export value of oil/gas exports in 
US$ per barrel. The data is constructed from surveys of IMF desk 
economists. See also Section 3 for further details.
Ossowski et al. (2008)
State 
Participation
State participation is captured by a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 0 if state ownership in national oil companies is on average 
below 30 percent. The variable is equal to 1 if state ownership in 
national oil companies is on average above 30 percent.
McPherson (2009)
Oil Production Oil production is measured by the production of crude oil, natural gas 
plant liquids (NGPL) and other liquids (such as biodiesel and ethanol) 
in thousand barrels per day. 
Energy Information 
Administration (2006)
Non-Oil GDP Non-oil GDP is measured as total GDP minus oil revenues in constant 
international US$ dollar. 
Ossowski et al. (2008)
Corruption The corruption score captures the likelihood that government officials 
will   demand   special   payments   and   the   extent   to   which   illegal 
payments are expected throughout government tiers. The score ranges 
from 1 to 6, with higher values indicating less corruption. For the 
empirical analysis, we multiply the score by -1 so that higher values 
denote more corruption. 
Political   Risk   Services, 
(2009)
Polity2 The Polity2 score  is based on the constraints placed on the chief 
executive,  the competitiveness of political participation,  and the 
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment. The score 
ranges  from -10 to +10, with higher values indicating stronger 
democratic institutions.
Polity IV database




The checks and balance score is based on the number of veto players 
in a political system, adjusted for whether these veto players are 
independent of each other as determined  by the level of electoral 
competitiveness in a system, their respective party affiliations, and the 
electoral rules. The score ranges between 1 to 5, with higher values 
indicating stronger checks and balances.
Database   of   Political 
Institutions   (Keefer   and 
Stasavage, 2003)
Political Rights The political rights score captures the electoral process, political 
pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government. The 
score ranges from 1 to 7. For comparison purposes we rescale the 
score so that higher values indicate more political rights. 
Freedom House (2009)
Civil Liberties The civil liberty score measures freedom of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, and personal 
autonomy and individual rights. The score ranges from 1 to 7. For 
comparison purposes we rescale the score so that higher values 
indicate more civil liberties.
Freedom House (2009)
Civil Conflict Indicator variable that is unity if the country experiences a civil 
conflict. A civil conflict is defined as an  incompatibility which 
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force 
between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a 




The ethnic fractionalization index measures the probability that two 
randomly selected individuals in a country will not belong to the same 
ethnic group. The index ranges between 0 and 1 and is strictly 
increasing in the number of groups.
Alesina et al. (2003)
British Colonial 
Origin





Share of protestants is measured as the share of the population that is 
of protestant belief. 
Barro and McCleary (2003)
19Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Δ Oil Rents 0.091 0.256 -0.631 0.702 332
Δ Non-Oil GDP -0.013 0.098 -0.374 0.338 287
Δ Oil Production 0.050 0.172 -0.186 1.554 332
Δ Corruption -0.059 0.369 -1 2 301
Δ Checks and Balances 0.125 1.343 -11 11 320
Δ Polity2 0.037 0.509 -3 3 324
Δ Political Rights -0.015 0.415 -2 2 332
Δ Civil Liberties -0.015 0.400 -2 1 332
Civil Conflict  0.151 0.358 0 1 332
Table 3. Oil Rents and Corruption
ΔCorruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LS LS LS LS GMM




























Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Common Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 301 269 269 269 269
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(4) is least squares; column (5) system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Huber robust standard 
errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is the change in the PRS corruption score.  The corruption score is re-
scaled so that higher values denote more corruption. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 
percent confidence. 
20Table 4. The Endogenous Response of Oil Production to Corruption
                                                                        ΔOil Production                                                 ΔOil Rents              
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





















Overidentification, p-value 0.23 0.17 0.20 0.74 0.75 0.74
Underidentification, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
First-Stage, F-Statistic 7.62 6.59 4.21 7.62 6.59 4.21
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Common Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 289 273 256 289 273 256
Note: The instrumental variables for corruption are the change in the Polity2 score and lagged corruption. Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) present two-
stage least squares estimates; columns (3) and (6) present GMM estimates. P-values [in square brackets] are based on the Ánderson-Rubin test of 
statistical significance of the endogenous regressor (Δcorruption). The PRS corruption score is re-scaled so that higher values denote more corruption. 
*Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
21Table 5. Oil Rents, Country Characteristics, and Corruption
ΔCorruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LS LS LS LS LS LS






















Checks and Balances -0.061**
(0.024)












Δ Oil Rents*Africa Dummy 0.014
(0.275)
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Common Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 289 295 288 301 301 301
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable 
is the change in the PRS corruption score. The corruption score is re-scaled so that higher values denote more corruption. *Significantly different 
from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
22Table 6. Oil Rents and Polity Outcomes
ΔPolity2 ΔChecks and Balances ΔPolitical Rights ΔCivil Liberties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LS LS LS LS








Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Common Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 320 324 332 332
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country level. *Significantly different 
from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
Table 7. Oil Rents, Political Rights, Civil Liberties, and Civil Conflict
Civil Conflict Incidence Civil Conflict Onset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Logit FE GMM GMM GMM Logit FE GMM GMM GMM
















Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Common Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 332 332 332 332 332 332 332 332
Note: The estimation model in columns (1) and (5) is the conditional logit fixed effects model; columns (2)-(4) and (6)-(8) use system-GMM 
estimation (Blundell and Bond, 1998) assuming a linear probability model. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is civil conflict incidence; 
columns (5)-(8) civil conflict onset. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
23Table 8. Oil Rents, Corruption, and the State Ownership of Oil Production
ΔCorruption ΔPolitical Rights ΔCivil Liberties
Panel A: Countries with High State Ownership
(1) (2) (3)
LS LS LS






Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Common Time Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 194 207 207
Panel B: Countries with Low State Ownership
(1) (2) (3)
LS LS LS






Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Common Time Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 81 99 99
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the country level. Countries with High 
State Ownership (Panel A) refers to countries where the average state ownership in national oil companies is above 30 percent; Countries with Low 
State Ownership (Panel B) refers to countries where the average state ownership is below 30 percent. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent 
confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
24Appendix Table 1. List of Countries
Note: The table lists the country-specific average discount factor, the country-specific average PRS corruption score 
(higher values denote less corruption), and the country-specific average Polity2 score.
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Country Discount Factor Corruption Polity2
Algeria 0.96 2.50 -3.14
Angola 0.90 2.36 -2.07
Azerbaijan 0.91 2.00 -5.64
Bahrain 0.87 3.00 -8.43
Brunei 1.00 3.64 .
Cameroon 0.85 2.43 -4.00
Chad 0.55 . -2.57
Congo 0.85 3.07 -1.43
Ecuador 0.77 2.93 7.64
Equatorial Guinea 0.88 . -5.14
Gabon 0.89 1.00 -4.00
Indonesia 0.90 1.86 -0.07
Iran 0.89 3.21 -1.50
Kazakhstan 0.71 2.38 -4.36
Kuwait 0.81 2.64 -7.00
Libya 0.93 . -7.00
Mexico 0.79 2.57 5.57
Nigeria 0.95 1.50 -0.71
Norway 0.92 5.36 10.00
Oman 0.89 3.00 -8.71
Qatar 0.91 2.07 -10.00
Russia 0.83 2.00 5.43
Saudi Arabia 0.87 2.00 -10.00
Sudan 0.95 1.36 -6.57
Syria 0.87 3.14 -8.14
Trinidad and Tobago 0.99 2.79 9.64
UAE 0.92 2.00 -8.00
Venezuela 0.81 2.71 7.14
Vietnam 0.97 2.36 -7.00
Yemen 0.92 2.64 -2.07